JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM IN NEW JERSEY
The verdict came back on January 23, 1980. The jury deliberated
for two hours before finding an unemotional Brian Phelps guilty of the

January 12, 1979 murder and robbery of Max Remer, an Irvington
printer. Phelps attacked Remer outside Remer's apartment door, stabbing him in the left eye and leaving him to bleed to death within
minutes. With forty dollars of stolen money in hand, Brian Phelps
returned to the party he was attending before the incident occurred'
and bragged of the robbery and murder. 2
The all too familiar occurrence of murder had an unusual twist

this time. The defendant was a fourteen year old boy, a seventh
grader at Newark's Clinton Place Junior High School, and the youngest person in the modern New Jersey court system to be tried for
3
murder as an adult.
The harsh reality of such serious juvenile crime, coupled with a
staggering forty percent recidivist rate 4 and the failure of institutional
facilities to rehabilitate 5 and adequately house these offenders6 are
issues of such magnitude that they cannot be ignored by society and
the legislature. Statistics indicate that there has been a "substantial

increase in criminal arrests in New Jersey," 7 thirty-four percent of
IMalcolm, Boy 14, Found Guilty of Murder, Herald News, Jan. 24, 1980, at 5, col. 1
(Clifton-Passaic ed.).
Ild. at 5, col. 2.
Ild. at 5, col. 1. Brian Phelps was subsequently sentenced to 15 years in state prison. Sentencing Report, Essex County Hall of Records. Until 1977, waiver to adult court would have
been impossible for youths under age 16. The age for waiver, however, was lowered to 14,
permitting the transfer of juveniles to adult court. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-48 (West Cum.Supp.
1981-1982). Had Brian Phelps' case been heard in juvenile court, he would not have been labeled
a criminal upon adjudication, Id. § 2A:4-64, nor would he have been sentenced to state prison.
Id. § 2A:4-61. The waiver to adult court, though, brought the stigma and sanctions of criminality when the sentence was handed down. Id. § 2A:4-50.
I Telephone interview with James Stabile, Public Information Officer (Apr. 20, 1982). The
recidivist rate is based on the commission of actual new offenses rather than parole violations by
both juveniles and adults. Cf. NEw JEs-RS STATE PAnotE BD., ANNUAL REPoRT 36-37 (Feb. 23,
1982), (defines recidivism "as a return to custody as a result of the violation of the conditions of
parole"). The board has determined that the recidivist rate based on this definition is 10%. Id.
5 See supra note 4. The recidivist rate reflects the failure of the prison and correctional
system to rehabilitate juvenile and adult offenders.
8 Peet, The "Terrifying" Upsurge in juvenile Crime, Star Ledger, Apr. 11, 1982, at 15,
cols. 2-4.
7 NEw JEsEY CRIMINAL DISPoSrrION COMM'N, REPor 4 (Feb. 13, 1981) [hereinafter cited
as REort]. The Commission's membership is comprised of representatives of the New Jersey
Supreme Court, Attorney General, Public Advocate, Commissioner of Corrections, Chairman of
the Parole Board, the Legislature and Governor, pursuant to N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 2C:48-1 (West
Supp. 1982). The Commission provides a means for "regular and systematic consultation among
all important elements of the criminal justice system" in order to review disposition, parole,
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which are juvenile arrests, 8 and that violent offenses committed by
juveniles rose to forty-two percent of the total percentage of arrests,9
which is also increasing.' 0 Additionally, admissions to youth correctional facilities" have risen.' 2 Furthermore, while both the overall
crime rate and sentencing rate continued to surge,' 3 mid-1981 marked
facilities regarding
the crisis point for many of the state's institutional
4
their ability to house these juvenile offenders.1
The pre-1982 juvenile justice code (old code),' 5 failed to provide
answers to these problems. Critics of the old code contended that it
favored juveniles involved in heinous crime by allowing these youths
to escape the graver sentences meted out in adult court by disposing of
their cases with lenity in juvenile court.18 Societal concern that this
lenity was too high a price to pay resulted in a push for legislative
reform.' 7 Consequently, the New Jersey Code of Juvenile Justice
(new code)'1was enacted on July 23, 1982, and will go into effect on
September 1, 1983.' 9 The new code will no doubt have a substantial

probation and supervisory treatment in accordance with N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 2C:48-2 (West Supp.
1982). REPoirr, supra, at 1. With the wealth of data available to the Commission, it began
integrating the data in order to provide a useful tool in assessing the problems of criminality.
6 Peet, supra note 6, at 1, col. 3.
Id.
10 REmR'r, supra note 7, at 4. The increases in the juvenile system parallel the adult system.
During the first six months of 1980 violent crime rose by 15% and nonviolent crime by 10%. Id.
at 4.
1 The generic term "correctional facility" refers to prisons, jails, training schools and other
places that administer discipline, treatment, and rehabilitation during the period of confinement.
"2 REoarT, supra note 7, at 8 app.
(appended table of "Resident Population Counts by
Quarters"). The table indicates that within the last three months of 1980, youth correctional
populations rose by 4%. Correctional populations in general have increased by 5% during this
same period. Id. Indications suggest that these conditions are of a permanent nature due to
passage of the Parole Act of 1979, ch. 31, 1981 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 76 (West), which increased
the number of crimes which call for mandatory sentences of imprisonment. REPoirr, supra note
7, at 8 app. (appended Interoffice Memo to Robert D. Lipscher, Esq., from John P. McCarthy,
Jr., Esq., Administrative Office of the Courts (Feb. 11, 1981)).
13 REI'oirr, supra note 7, at 8 app. (appended Interoffice Memo to Robert D. Lipscher, Esq.,
from John P. McCarthy, Jr., Esq., Administrative Office of the Courts (Feb. 11, 1981)).
14 Peet, supra note 6, at 15, cols. 2-4. Maximum capacity was reached at Jamesburg in June,
1981 and Yardville has a waiting list of 90 youths. The increases in sentencings are "coming at a
time when the juvenile justice system is least equipped to handle it." Id. at 15, col. 2.
'3 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:4-42 to -68 (West Cum. Supp. 1981-1982).
38 See N.J. Assembly Bill No. 641 (Jan. 19, 1982) (statement 32).
17 Marks, LegislatorsMay Ease Teen Crime Reforms, Star Ledger, Dec. 16, 1981, at 1,cal.
2.
N.J. Assembly Bills Nos. 641-45 (Jan. 19, 1982).
19 Schwanberg, Kean EnactsJuvenile Justice Code with GreaterFocus on the Family, Star
Ledger, July 24, 1982, at 1, col. 1.
38
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impact. More juveniles will be treated more severely 20 from the initial
detention 2 ' to the final sentencing,22 thus closing the gap that exists

between a lenient juvenile and harsh adult system by giving little
advantage to youths who remain in the juvenile system. 3
This "get tough" attitude should come as no surprise to those who
are familiar with the juvenile justice system. While the general public
has assumed for years that the juvenile system is basically lenient,2 4 in
actuality it is a "hostile" 2 system which weighs society's welfare
against the juvenile's best interest 6 when disposing of the juvenile's
case. This tension between society's need to protect itself and the

conflicting need for juvenile rehabilitation and care has become more
pronounced as the frequency and severity of juvenile crime has
grown. The push, therefore, for a juvenile system in New Jersey that

will apply a firmer hand in those cases in which it retains jurisdiction, 7 and relax its waiver rules in order to transfer more juveniles to
adult court28 is really only a legislative continuance of a trend that
was set in motion some years ago. 2 9 The sociological "friendly"
20Marks, supra note 17, at 1, col. 2; see also N.J. Assembly Bill No. 641 (Jan. 19, 1982)
(statement 27).
" N.J. Assembly Bill No. 641, § 17 (Jan. 19, 1982). If the court waives the juvenile to adult
court, there will be a hearing before the family court in order to decide whether the juvenile will
be detained in a juvenile or adult facility. Id. The old code contains no such provision for this
type of hearing.
21 Parole Act of 1979, ch. 31, 1981 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 76 (West). With the increased
numbers of waiver cases that will occur, transferring juveniles to adult court will bring with it
the sanctions now available in adult court, such as mandatory sentencing. See id. The initial
waiver will occur with greater frequency because the new code reduces the juvenile's chances of
proving that he can be rehabilitated within the juvenile system, by reducing the age of majority
from 21 to 19. N.J. Assembly Bill No. 641, § 7 (Jan.19, 1982).
See N.J. Assembly Bill No. 641 (Jan. 19, 1982) (statement 32).
14 See, e.g., Marks, supra note 17, at 1, col. 2; Peet, supra note 6, at 15, col. 3.
Mead, The Psychology of Punitive Justice, 23 AM. J. OF Soc. 5, 577-80 (1918). Human
nature is comprised of an organization of instincts that are subject to modification by experience
and which produce complex acts. These acts are the consequences of instincts that have modified
each other over the course of time. Such instincts have been classified into two diametrically
opposing groups: "hostile" and "friendly." Hostility arises when individuals, who normally
adjust themselves to each other in society, come into conflict with one another. This conflict,
which produces nonconforming behavior, is the manifestation of the breakdown of the modification of human nature. Id.
'aSee generally Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555 (1966).
" N.J. Assembly Bill No. 641 (Jan. 19, 1982) (statement 27).
t Id. (statement 28).
t'See generally Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555-56 (1966). Kent states that while
theoretically the state is supposed to handle a juvenile case as parens patriae, this often breaks
down in reality due to lack of personnel and facilities. The Court extended several, but not all of
the constitutional rights afforded adults to guard against "procedural arbitrariness." Id. The
Court, a few years later, once again emphasized this point when it remarked that "civil labels
and good intentions do not themselves obviate the need for criminal due process safeguards in
juvenile courts." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365-66 (1970).
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model of treatment, which concerns itself with the juvenile's best
interests while disregarding societal interest and subsequently poses no
conflict in its parens patriae application, 30 was cast as the untenable
alternative to the "hostile" model now employed in both the juvenile
and adult systems at the disposition phase. 3 1 In both the old and new
codes, the legislature determined that, because many juveniles in
trouble do not resort to self-help by seeking out psychologists, social
32
workers, or parental guidance in accordance with the "friendly"
model, society cannot be expected to pay the price. 33 By enactment
of
of these codes a balance was struck, and as with any balancing
34
values, someone has made a sacrifice or has been sacrificed.
After coming to grips with this incompatability of needs and the
concommitant use of the adversarial court system, 35 the United States
Supreme Court acknowledged that juveniles had the "worst of both
worlds." 36 If tried as juveniles, these young offenders did not have
the constitutional safeguards afforded adults in the adult system, yet37
the juvenile system mirrored the adult system in its hostile nature.
A trilogy of United States Supreme Court cases, Kent v. United
States, 38 In re Gault,39 and In re Winship,4 0 extended adult rights to
juveniles. Kent held that in accordance with due process and the right
to counsel, the juvenile court must grant a hearing and allow the
30 Mead, supra note 25, at 578. The "friendly" model at its base assumes that human nature
is composed of parental and sexual instincts, which by definition present no conflict and
therefore do not require legal administration.
31 See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 554, 555-56 (1966); N.J. Assembly Bill No. 641 (Jan.
19, 1982) (statement 27).
2 Mead, supra note 25, at 578.
33 N.J. Assembly Bill No. 641 (Jan. 19, 1982) (statement 27).
Compare N.J. Assembly Bill No. 641, § 2 (Jan. 19, 1982) with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-42
(West Curn. Supp. 1981-1982). These two provisions are basically the same in laying out the
purposes of the old and new codes. Both seek to preserve family unity and provide adequate care
and rehabilitation for the juvenile without the stigma of criminality. The two codes, however,
take a balancing approach in the achievement of these objectives. Weighed against the juvenile's
interests are the public's interests in its safety. If the court determines that the public safety
weighs more heavily, the child may be removed from his family after being charged with
delinquency and detained elsewhere. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:4-42; N.J. Assembly Bill No. 641 §
2. 3

B.

ZUPANCIC, CIUMINAL LAW: THE
CONF1Cr AND THE

RuLxs 26 (1981). The conflict

between the state's best interest as opposed to the juvenile's best interest is resolved through the
adversary process which procedurally serves the purpose of impartiality by application of legal
formalities and adherence to its rules. Id. See generally id. at 1-39.
30 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 554, 556 (1966).
37 Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary System: Problems of Function and Form,
1965 Wis. L. REv. 7, 24.
- 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
387 U.S. 1 (1967).
40

397 U.S. 358 (1970).
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juvenile's attorney access to records, probation and other such reports
4
before waiving a juvenile to adult criminal court for prosecution. 1
In re Gault held that to fulfill the requirements of due process and fair
treatment the juvenile and his parents were entitled to written notice
of the specific charges brought against the youth, 42 notification of the
right to counsel, 43 application of the fifth amendment's protection
against self-incrimination, 44 and absent a confession, the opportunity
to cross examine sworn testimony in delinquency and commitment
proceedings. 45 Lastly, In re Winship held that a standard of guilt of
"beyond a reasonable doubt" was to be applied to juvenile cases
during the adjudicatory stage when the juvenile had committed an act
which would have drawn criminal charges if otherwise committed by
an adult. 46 For the court system to truly align itself with reality, it
should continue the course set forth in the trilogy in order to prevent
continued discrimination against juveniles caught up in a hostile juvenile system.
The sociological framework of the "friendly" and "hostile"
models

47

provides a powerful foundation essential to any analysis and

understanding of the pre-1982 juvenile justice code, 48 particularly the
areas of detention, 40 disposition,50 and waiver. 5 '

Before any examination of these three areas is undertaken, the
jurisdictional element that affects juvenile cases must be considered.
The juvenile and domestic relations court's exclusive jurisdiction52 to
41 383 U.S. at 561. The Court stated that the juvenile's hearing may be an informal one and
that counsel must be given the necessary latitude to function on behalf of the juvenile. The
requirement of counsel "is of the essence of justice" and without it, the right to a hearing would
be rendered meaningless. Id.
"1 387 U.S. at 33. Notice of the charges as soon as possible allows the juvenile's attorney time
to prepare his case. Id.
43 Id. at 41.
44 Id. at 47-50. Because a juvenile may be incarcerated as a result of a finding of delinquency, he must be given his constitutional right to invoke the plea of self-incrimination. The
Constitution explicitly forbids compelling a witness to testify against himself when he runs the
risk of losing his liberty. Id. at 50.
4S Id. at 57.
46 397 U.S. at 368.
4' See Mead, supra note 25, at 578.
46 N.J. STAT. ANN, §§ 2A:4-42 to -68 (West Cum. Supp. 1981-1982).
49 Id. § 2A:4-56. According to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-43(c) (West Cum. Supp. 1981-1982),
detention referred to the "temporary care of juveniles in physically restricting facilities pending
court disposition." Id.
50 Id. §§ 2A:4-61 to -62. After an adjudication of delinquency, the court selected from
amongst a list of alternatives, the proper or most suitable one for that particular case. Id.
51 Id. §§ 2A:4-48 to -49. Waiver was the transfer of a juvenile with or without his consent to
another court. Id.
st Id. § 2A:4-46. The exceptions to exclusive jurisdiction were the waiver provisions. Id. §§
2A:4-48 to -49.
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decide these issues under the old code existed in all cases in which it
was charged that a juvenile 53 had committed an act of "delinquency"5 or was a "juvenile in need of supervision" (JINS).55 The
"jurisdictional net," indeed, was broad. 56 While delinquency encompassed homicide, other crime, disorderly persons offenses, and violations of ordinances and regulations, 57 JINS covered a wide variety of
noncriminal acts such as incorrigibility, disobedience, and truancy. 58
After a youth was charged with delinquency or needing supervision under the old code, the presumption was in favor of release into
the custody of one or both parents unless the juvenile's health, safety,
or welfare would be adversely affected.59 Those youths charged with
delinquency could not be detained prior to disposition of their cases
unless it was necessary to guarantee their presence at an upcoming
hearing6" or their release would jeopardize the community's safety. 6 '
JINS could not be placed in shelter care6 2 - prior to disposition unless
there was no appropriate adult who would assume responsibility for
the youth,6 3 the shelter care was needed to offer protection to the
juvenile6 4 or assure the youth's presence at the next hearing, 65 or, the
mental or physical health of the youth weighed against release.60 A
juvenile, furthermore, could be detained or sheltered only in those
facilities designated by the State Department of Institutions and Agencies, 6 7 except that juveniles could not be detained in any prison, jail or
lookup, including police stations. If no other facilities were reasonably
53 Id. § 2A:4-43(a). Juveniles were defined as persons younger than 18 years of age. Id.

34 Id. § 2A:4-44.
" Id. § 2A:4-45. JINS has become the generic term which loosely refers to both the offender
and types of violations.
" Empey, Juvenile Justice Reform: Diversion, Due Process and Deinstitutionalization, in
PMSONERS IN AMERCA 17 (L. Ohlin ed. 1973). The author states that "[i]t
is ironic, but true, that
children can be found guilty and sanctioned, often severely, for acts which, if committed by an
adult, might not even have resulted in arrest." Id. In many states a child can be adjudged a
delinquent quite easily because of the breadth of the court's jurisdiction. Id. Such overreaching
may produce more harm than good. Legal definition may be insensitive to the "subtle and
difficult issues" of learning and socialization and the attendant needs of juveniles. Id. at 18.
7 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-44 (West Cum. Supp. 1981-1982). Juveniles 17 years of age or
older would not be found delinquent, though, for motor vehicles violations.
Id. § 2A:4-45.
39 Id. § 2A:4-56(a).
60 Id. § 2A:4-56(b)(1).
a' Id. § 2A:4-56(b)(2).
62 Id. § 2A:4-43(d). Shelter care was defined as the nonphysically restrictive temporary care
of youths in facilities prior to court disposition. Id.
Id. § 2A:4-56(c)(1).
" Id. § 2A:4-56(c)(2).
s Id. § 2A:4-56(c)(3).
Id. § 2A:4-56(c)(4).
67Id. § 2A:4-57(b).
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available, though, a youth could be held in a police station, apart
from any detention places and any adults charged or convicted of
crimes, for a brief period until his parents came for him or another
facility was made available.68
Upon adjudging the juvenile to be a delinquent, 69 the court,
under the old code, could dispose of the case in a variety of ways. 7°
The court could delay formal entry for up to a year and then dismiss
the case if a youth made satisfactory progress 7' or could release the
child into the custody of his parents or guardian. 72 Other dispositions
included probation for up to three years;" 3 transferral of custody to
the child's relatives or other persons; 74 placement under the Division
of Youth and Family Services; 75 placement under the Commissioner
of the Department of Human Services in order to receive help from
the Division of Mental Retardation; 76 commitment for treatment of
mental disease if the child was not dangerous; 77 commitment to an
institution for the rehabilitation of delinquency for an indeterminate
period not to exceed three years, unless the act charged would constitute a charge of homicide if committed by an adult, in which case the
indeterminate sentence was not to exceed the maximum sentence a
convicted adult would receive; 78 and other dispositions not inconsist79
ent with the code's intent.
Dispositions of JINS cases included the aforementioned dispositions applicable to delinquents except commitment to an institution
for rehabilitation of delinquency. 80 Physical restriction of JINS was
prohibited unless commitment was to an institution for mental retardation or for the care of individuals addicted to controlled dangerous
substances. 8'

- Id. § 2A:4-57(c).
See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
70 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-61 (West Cum. Supp. 1981-1982).
" Id. § 2A:4-61(a).
id. § 2A:4-61(b).
'4 Id. § 2A:4-61().
7' Id. § 2A:4-61(d).
7s Id. § 2A:4-61(e).
'8 ld. § 9.A:-61(f).
I § 2A:4-61(g).
Id.
I8
Id. § 2A:4-61(h).
IId. § 2A:4-61(i).
IId. § 2A:4-62(a).
Al Id. § 2A:4-62(b). Controlled dangerous substances include drugs and substances as described in Schedules I-V of Article 2 but exclude wine, distilled liquors and tobacco. Id. § 24:21-
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In a small number of situations 82 in which the juvenile was age
fourteen or older, 83 charged with a serious crime,84 a threat to society's
welfare, 85 and had no reasonable prospects for rehabilitation by the
age of majority within the juvenile system, 88 the court waived jurisdiction over the case and referred it to adult criminal court and the
prosecuting authorities.8 7 The effect of waiver was to process the case
as if it had been instituted initially in adult court. 88 Yet, despite the
waiver provisions, the clear presumption under the old code was in
favor of treatment within the juvenile system, 89 rather than waiver to
adult criminal court.
The new code, 90 replete with clarifications, expansions, and
changes, signals the legislature's perception of the limitations and
failures of the old code regarding detention, disposition and waiver.
Prior to any discussion of these areas, the prerequisite jurisdictional
element that affects such cases must be examined.
The new family court 9' (previously the juvenile and domestic
relations court) will retain jurisdiction over both delinquency cases92
and juvenile-family crises9 3 (formerly JINS) under the new code. 9'
82 See Marks, supra note 17, at 12, col. 2.
83 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-48(a) (West Cum. Supp. 1981-1982).
4 Id. § 2A:4-48(b).
8 Id. § 2A:4-48(c).
83 Id. The age of majority was interpreted as age 21. State in re G.T., 143 N.J. Super. 73.
362 A.2d 1171 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 71 N.J. 531, 366 A.2d 687 (1976); see Comment, 3
SErON HALL LE is. J. 89-93 (1977).
87 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-48 (West Cum. Supp. 1981-1982). This provision provided for
waiver without the juvenile's consent. Id. Voluntary waiver was available as well, to juveniles
charged with delinquency who were age 14 or older. Id. § 2A:4-49.
" Id. § 2A:4-50.
69 See State v. Tuddles, 38 N.J. 565, 571, 186 A.2d 284, 287 (1962). The emphasis in juvenile
cases was placed on rehabilitation rather than punishment. Id. Prior to 1977 when the age of
waiver was 16, considering the presumption in favor of rehabilitation by the age of majority
most juveniles could persuade a court that they should remain within the juvenile system rather
than be waived over to adult court. After 1977, when the age for waiver was lowered to 14 by
the legislature, the juvenile had an even easier time arguing that his case should be heard in
juvenile rather than adult court. The age of majority was interpreted by the courts as 21, and this
gave the juvenile 3-7 years for rehabilitation. See supra note 86. This judicial decision effectively
undercut the legislature's efforts since the legislative intent was to have waiver occur with
greater, not lesser frequency by changing the age from 16 to 14. Comment, 3 SrrON HALL LECis.
J. 92-93 (1977).
9 N.J. Assembly Bills Nos. 641-45 (Jan. 19, 1982).
91 Id. No. 642, §§ 1, 2.
92 Id. No. 641, § 4. This provision is worded substantially the same as the prior law.
Compare id. with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-44 (West Cum. Supp. 1981-1982).
93 N.J. Assembly Bill No. 641, § 3(g) (Jan. 19, 1982). This definition is similar to the
definition found in the prior law. Compare id. with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-45 (West Cum.
Supp. 1981-1982).
N.J. Assembly Bill No. 642, § 3 (Jan. 19, 1982).
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The juvenile's family,9 5 however, will also be subject to the court's
jurisdiction in matters of delinquency and juvenile-family crises. 96
Once jurisdiction is established and the youth is charged with

delinquency under the new code, the presumption of release is triggered, similar to the old code. 9 7 While the old and new codes' criteria
for detention are basically the same, 98 the new code provides for a
hearing to determine whether a juvenile, who has been waived to
adult court, will be detained in an adult or juvenile facility. 99 The
legislature has determined that the family court is in the most advantageous position to decide which facility best serves the interests of
both the juvenile and society. 00 The new code additionally gives a
list of factors to be considered in making such a judgment: the juve-

nile's age; maturity; the nature of the offense; and the youth's prior
record. 10 1 Furthermore, until such a hearing is conducted, no juvenile who has been waived over may be remanded to an adult deten10 2
tion facility.
Not only have the detention provisions been expanded, 10 3 but the
disposition terms 0 4 have been broadened by adding new alternatives
beyond what was previously available. 0 5 These include fines, 0 6 restitution, 0 7 community service, 08 and vocational training. 0 9 The

91 Id.No. 641, § 3(a). This provision is consistent with the prior law which defines juveniles
as persons under the age of 18. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-43(a) (West Cum. Supp. 1981-1982).
96 N.J. Assembly Bill No. 642, § 3 (Jan. 19, 1982).
11 Id. No. 641, § 15. Provisions for the release to parents or the temporary care of juveniles
are basically the same under both codes. Compare id. No. 644, §§ 5, 13, 14 with N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:4-56(c)(I-4) (West Cum. Supp. 1981-1982).
95 Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-56(a)-(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1981-1982); with N.J.
Assembly Bill No. 641, § 15 (Jan.19, 1982).
" N.J. Assembly Bill No. 641, § 17(a) (Jan. 19, 1982).
'0 Id. (statement 30).
101 Id. § 17(a).
101 Id. § 17(b).
103 See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
104N.J. Assembly Bill No. 641, § 24(b) (Jan. 19, 1982).
100 Id. (statement 31).
I- Id. § 24(b)(8).
10 Id. § 24(b)(9). See infra note 143.
I" N.J. Assembly Bill No. 641, § 24(b)(10) (Jan. 19, 1982). Community service is compulsory
if ordered by the court but must be reasonable in its application. The juvenile need not be
compensated for such service, but all monies earned are to be applied towards restoring the
victim or payment of the fine levied on such juvenile. Id. The code, as it stands, gives no concrete
examples of community service. Id.
"0 Id. § 24(b)(11). Vocational training consists of work programs "designed to provide job
skills and specific employment training to enhance the employability of job participants." Id.
Similar to the community service provisions, the juvenile need not be compensated for his
participation, provided that restitution or fines be paid from the money earned. Id.
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court, in deciding on the appropriate action," l0 may order the parents
to participate in the disposition' and will consider the same criteria
as those used in determining the proper detention facility when
waiver has occurred." 2 Finally, there is one other new provision on
which the courts can rely, short term incarceration," 3 which stands
apart from the standard term of incarceration."14 The legislative
intent is that such incarceration, which may not exceed sixty days," 5
will deter the commission of future crimes by youths who have previously committed certain serious offenses currently undefined in the
new code."6 This deterrence value is sought within a scheme of
rehabilitation.1 7 Short term incarceration, however, is permissible
only in those juvenile facilities located in counties which have met the
physical and program standards required by the Department of Corrections." 8 Furthermore, an agreement must be reached by the
county and the Department," 9 and the actual facilities cannot have
exceeded fifty percent of maximum capacity 20 in order to place juveniles into these facilities. These stipulations effectively curtail the use
2
of this disposition as an alternative to the other dispositions. ' '
Besides the broadening of the disposition provisions, 22 the new
legislation also includes a presumption of imprisonment for certain
serious crimes such as homicide, robbery, and rape. 23 Because stiffer
sentences will now be available in juvenile court, there will be less
dependency on waiver to adult court. 2 4 At the other end of the
continuum there is a presumption of nonincarceration for juveniles
who have committed crimes of the fourth degree or less and have no
25
prior record.
110 The new code contains other dispositions as well, such as participation in outdoor programs, id. § 24(b)(12), and academic and/or vocational counseling, Id. § 24(b)(13).
"I Id. § 24(b)(15).
112See supra note 101 and accompanying text.

N.J. Assembly Bill No. 641, § 24(c)(1) (Jan. 19, 1982).
11 Id. (statement 32).
113

11 Id. § 24(c)(1).
116 Id. (statement 32). The legislature has not stated which crimes are encompassed by this
provision. Id.
117

Id.

118 Id. § 24(c)(1).
"1
10

Id. § 24(c)(2). The agreement concerns the use of the institution for sentenced juveniles. Id.

Id.

,1 Id. (statement 32). The use of short term incarceration is limited because of the overcrowded conditions in the state's youth correctional institutions. Many of the facilities have
surpassed not only 50% of capacity, but maximum capacity as well. See Peet, supra note 6.
RU

See supra notes 104-10 and accompanying text.

- N.J. Assembly Bill No. 641 (statement 32) (Jan.19, 1982).

124 Id.

I

(statements 32 & 33).
Id. § 25(b)(1).
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The need for a definite hardline approach has also impacted the
sentencing portions of the code. 126 The old code's provisions for
indeterminate sentences 127 have been supplemented with maximum
sentences, 128 allowances for extended sentences, 12 and parole qualifi0
cations.13
Finally, the area of waiver' 3 ' has undergone change by enactment of the new legislation. Waiver will occur based on the same
serious charges incorporated into the old code, 32 but with greater
frequency. 33 Under the new code a juvenile must show by a preponderance of the evidence that he can be rehabilitated by the age of
nineteen in order to avoid waiver. 34 Lowering the age from twentyone to nineteen makes it more difficult for a juvenile to establish that
he can be rehabilitated within the juvenile system. 135 The conclusion
to be drawn from these changes is that untold numbers of youths will
have their cases heard in adult criminal court, adding one more
burden to an already overburdened system. 136 After waiver has taken
place, and consistent with the prior law, these juveniles will be
treated as though their cases were initiated in the adult court in the
first instance.137
The assumption, of course, is that society will benefit from the
new legislation. In many ways the new code is a vast improvement
158Id. § 25(d)(1).
127 See supra text accompanying note 78.
I" N.J. Assembly Bill No. 641, § 25(d)(1) (Jan. 19, 1982). The maximum sentence imposed on
a juvenile cannot exceed the maximum applied to adults convicted of the same offense. Id.

11 Id. § 25(d)(3)(4). A juvenile may be sentenced to an extended term of incarceration for
those acts considered to be crimes of the first, second, or third degree if committed by an adult.
This sentence is possible only if the juvenile has previously been adjudged a delinquent on a
minimum of two distinct occasions for offenses which would have constituted crimes of the first
or second degree if committed by an adult and he was committed to an adult or juvenile
correctional institution. Id.
130 Id. § 25(d)(2). The length of actual incarceration and parole taken together cannot exceed
the maximum sentence provided for the offense. Id. Juveniles, however, can be approved for
parole very soon after the initial incarceration with the approval of the sentencing court. Id.
131 See supra notes 82-87 and accompanying text.
112 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-48 (West Cum. Supp. 1981-1982).
13I See N.J. Assembly Bill No. 641 (Jan. 19, 1982) (statement

28). Juveniles may still elect
waiver under the new code. Id. § 8. Cf. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-49 (West Cum. Supp. 19811982).
13 N.J. Assembly Bill No. 641, § 7(a)(4) (Jan. 19, 1982).
1" See supra notes 86 & 89. Instead of a 3-7 year term for rehabilitation, a youth will have 1-5
years for rehabilitation. For some youths it will become more difficult to sustain the burden of
proving they can be rehabilitated within the juvenile system. N.J. Assembly Bill No. 641, §
7(a)(4) (Jan. 19, 1982).
'36 De Muro, Revamp Opposed on Juvenile Code, Star Ledger, Nov. 28, 1981, at 10, col. 2.
137 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-50 (West Cum. Supp. 1981-1982); N.J. Assembly Bill No. 641, § 9
(Jan. 19, 1982).
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over the old code. The juvenile justice system will be improved by the
expansions and clarifications of both the detention and disposition
provisions. The detention provisions clearly set forth the criteria to be
considered in making the judgment to detain a juvenile and furthermore formally place responsibility for the first time on the family
court to determine at a hearing the appropriate place of detention for
those same juveniles waived to adult court. In addition to the improvements in the area of detention, the disposition provisions have
been changed for the better. Dispositions such as fines and restitution
help remove the profitability of crime while attempting to restore the
victim to the position he was in prior to the commission of the
crime.13 8 Also, vocational training provides skills that will help these
youths earn a decent wage and lead productive lives. 139 Yet although
these changes are for the better, the code is flawed.
Initially, some of the individual provisions are inadequate. Specifically, the jurisdictional net should be narrowed to encompass delinquency cases only. 40 Handling status offenders (formerly JINS) in
juvenile court has little or no relation to the reduction of juvenile
crime and occupies valuable time that could be better spent dealing
with dangerous juveniles who have criminally misbehaved.' 4'
Furthermore, the new code falls short in its failure to lay down
guidelines regarding restitution as an alternative disposition. 42 Such
guidelines are necessary to provide standards of applicability, size of
43
penalty, and timeliness of payment.
The code additionally lacks provisions for the increased supervision of juveniles after they are released and about to reenter society. 44 Incarceration outside of the juvenile's community for prolonged periods causes instability. 45 This factor coupled with the
emotional trauma of adolescence or post adolescence creates a volatile
"3

H. AcTON, PUNISHMENT: FoR AND AGAINST 47-48 (1971).

D. ZELINSKI, PROGRAMS OF THE YARDVILLE YOUTH RECEmON AND CORRECTION CENTER 9-10
(1981). The types of programs available include auto mechanics and body repair, culinary arts,
masonry and construction work. Id. at 10.
"4 See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
141 See De Muro, supra note 136, at 10, col. 3.
341 N.J. Assembly Bill No. 641, § 24(b)(9) (Jan. 19, 1982).
M'The restitution provision broadly states that the court will determine the amounts and
conditions of restitution, and exempts those individuals who cannot pay now and will not be able
to pay later. Id..
In some cases such as murder, restitution may not be appropriate at all, and in other cases,
the offender may be unwilling to restore property to the victim, which would leave the authorities in a position of constantly having to pursue those who must pay. H. ACTON, supra note 138,
at 48.
'4' De Muro, supra note 136, at 10, col. 3.
145 BEHIND BARs 72 (R. Kwartzler ed. 1977).
139

COMMENTS
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situation that can be avoided by providing adequate supervision at
reentry.
Apart from these singular inadequacies, the new legislation,
viewed in its entirety, has even greater flaws. The new code displays
an inconsistent attitude by providing for harsher dispositions within
the juvenile system

46

while relaxing waiver standards 147 which will

transfer greater numbers of juveniles to adult court. With the wide
choice of dispositions available in juvenile court, there should be little
if any need for waiver to adult court. Retention of the waiver provisions, therefore, can only be justified as a method of appeasing society, and this will hardly be necessary once society becomes aware of
the changes in the juvenile system. Voluntary waiver which will be
retained in the new code 148 should also not be seen as a justification of
the waiver provision; this election simply indicates that the deficiencies of the juvenile system, namely the failure to accord juveniles full
constitutional rights in a "hostile" juvenile system, have yet to be
corrected. This denial of rights to juveniles,149 particularly indictment, trial by jury, and bail, is the warning light that the code's
overall approach to juvenile crime is seriously misguided. Fairness
demands that in an adversarial system, procedurally both parties be
on equal footing. Yet, the juvenile system's attitude toward disposition
is becoming harsher while juveniles remain deprived of their basic
rights in order to have a fair hearing. The legislature can no longer
ignore the fact that once a juvenile is handed over to the legal system,
conflict arises between the state's interest in guarding its citizen's
welfare and the juvenile's best interest,150 and no amount of masking
or label swapping will alter this basic tenet.' 5'
Finally, no study of the new code is complete in a vacuum. There
are two external factors which exert pressure on the code that must be
considered: societal fear of escalating crime 152 and the overburdened
53
prison and correctional system.
It may be assumed that in a newly formed and developing society, the normal evolutionary process is that societal alarm due to
deviant behavior affects the development of criminal laws which in
148 See supra notes 113-17 and accompanying text.

11 See supra notes 131-37 and accompanying text.
148See supra note 133.
11gN.J. Assembly Bill No. 641, § 21 (Jan. 19, 1982).
150See Mead, supra note 25, at 582-603.
"I See, e.g., N.J. Assembly Bill No. 642, § 1 (Jan. 19, 1982). The new legislation changes the
name of the court to the family court.
15t Marks, supra note 20, at 1, col. 2.
's3 See REPonTr, supra note 7; see also supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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turn lead to the construction of lock up facilities and the creation of
sentencing alternatives to deal with the offenders. This course of
development, however, has long passed in New Jersey. The state is
presently at the stage where widespread societal alarm and overcrowded institutions are the status quo. What remains in flux is the
law, which has yet to address the external pressures coming to bear on
it.
The current state of affairs is analogous to a nut in a nutcracker.
No matter how hard and tough the law is, with pressure from both
prongs, societal alarm and overcrowded penal institutions, it is bound
to crack, and any legislature that fails to address and alleviate these
external pressures will find its solution to be an exercise in futility. The
most stinging criticisms of the new code to date suggest that these
problems have been ignored.'
Yet despite such neglect, certain changes can be made to reduce
these external pressures. First, societal fear can be reduced by enactment of laws which afford average citizens greater latitude in protecting themselves when subject to criminal attacks. 5- Second, pressure
stemming from overburdened correctional facilities can be relieved as
well. With the passage of the new code, added numbers of juveniles in
the juvenile and adult correctional facilities will create the need to
expand existing facilities at a cost of approximately $65,000 per correctional bed.156 Yet large, expensive facilities have never proven to
be the solution to the delinquency problem; they exist primarily to
warehouse bodies.157 The legislature must focus elsewhere in order to
reduce the incidence of first-time offenses and the recidivist rate,
thereby cutting down the number of delinquents and the need for
more beds. It should provide funding for more community based, free
mental health clinics, as preventative measures which stand apart
from the legal system.15 8 These clinics should be staffed to handle
problems that have not yet blossomed into juvenile-family crises and

See De Muro, supra note 136, at 10, col. 3.
should be permitted to carry chemical substances such as mace to be used in
situations of self defense.
15See De Muro, supra note 136, at 10, col. 3. As of July 22, 1981, correctional institutions
housed a total 6,969 inmates, of whom 41% were serving 1-5 years, 26% were serving 6-15
years, 24% were serving 15 years or longer, and 8% were serving life sentences. N.J. DEI'T OF
CORanEcTIONS, INMATES IN NEw JERSEY CORRjcrIONAL INSTITUTIONS ON JULY 22, 1981: TOTAL
TERM AT ADMISSION (1981). The age breakdown for adolescents revealed that 3% of the total
number of incarcerations were 15 years or younger and 17% were 16-20 years of age. See also
154

15- Citizens

Peet, supra note 6, at 15, cols. 2-4.
"5 See N. Moius, THE FuTuRE OF IMPRISONMENT (1974).
's8 See C. WHIELDE, COUNTERt-DEYREIENcE 124 (1978).
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those which have become crises, which in turn should be removed
from the family court's jurisdiction.
Other inroads must be made, also, in order to prevent crime.
Most communities have few, if any, recreational facilities so essential
to channeling adolescent energy into constructive behavior. With nowhere to go and no supervision on the streets, it is little wonder youths
end up in gangs involved in destructive activity.
Community mental health centers and recreation facilities, are
two social approaches to the problem of reducing the number of first
time offenses. They serve as examples to show that there are nonlegal
as well as legal solutions available to prevent crime.
In the legal realm, children should be placed in crisis intervention programs replete with family counseling within their own community when first time arrests occur. 5 With the exception of a few
60
extremely dangerous juveniles, no children should be incarcerated. 1
To this extent, all New Jersey state training schools 161 should be closed
down 16 2 and the highly dangerous youths transferred to smaller com-

munity units for intensive rehabilitative treatment and care. 16 3 The
effect of such a community approach should be a lowered recidivist
rate in New Jersey.
The above nonlegal and legal solutions to the problems of crime
prevention and rehabilitation are community oriented. Given that
juvenile offenses often stem from community conditions and that these
juveniles wish to productively function in these same communities, it
is only reasonable to expect that these communities should take responsibility for providing the necessary programs and support to aid
6
these youths.1

4

This movement toward community based programs in an effort
to curtail crime and alleviate the pressure stemming from the over-

K. VooDEN, WEEPING IN THE PLAYTIME OF OTHERS 234 (1976).
Id. The ability to make accurate decisions concerning those that will be incarcerated will
depend on how advanced the fields of psychology and sociology are.
161The term, "training school" generally connotes a correctional facility that attempts to
reeducate juveniles often times through vocational training.
I"2 See Wooden. supra note 159, at 234.
1b Id., see Kwartzler, supra note 145, at 136-37. Most prison administrators contend that 3040% of inmates in adult correctional facilities could be transferred to community programs. Id.
at 137. These statistics should apply equally to juveniles who need the nurturing effects of their
families and communities.
, See generally N.J. Dss'T OF CORRECTIONS, INMATES IN CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS ON
JvNE 24, 1981: ETHNIC IDENTInCATION (1981). The ethnic makeup of all incarcerated offenders
was 59% black, 30% white, and 10% hispanic. Id.
''

'
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crowded prison and correctional system will no doubt require a great
deal of time and large sums of money.165
More than time and money, however, these programs require
commitment from society. Unfortunately, the obvious dearth of such
programs is illustrative of a further reaching problem. American society has never placed a premium on rehabilitating people, 66 be they
juveniles or adults, whether in a community setting or in correctional
facilities. It is a sad commentary that this society, presently, as in the
past, has taken only a half-hearted look at a problem from which it
would rather look away.
And while society may be aware from crime statistics that it has
been victimized in the past, it has never grasped hold of how, each
time the jail door closes, the losses of talent, creativity, and potential
contribution have made it victim once again.
Catherine G. Attara-Fink

I's Despite the costs incurred by instituting community based programs, these programs are
less expensive than expanding the current, warehouse type facility. See supra notes 136 & 156
and accompanying text.
10 See generally Allen, Legal Values and the RehabilitativeIdeal, in 2 CRME AND JUsrICE 1018 (L. Radzinowicz ed. 1977).

